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THE INFIRMITIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
THE NEW YORK CITY PLAN
On April 17, 1973 Mayor John Lindsay proposed new contract bid
regulations designed to eliminate discrimination in employment in
New York City. The regulations announced by the Mayor were im-
plemented and are the basis of New York City's present affirmative
action program to increase the number of minority persons em-
ployed in city-financed construction projects. This comment will
analyze the development of affirmative action programs with em-
phasis on the New York City program and its viability in light of
expected attacks based on the federal preemption doctrine. Since
the nature of affirmative action programs is to require contractors
to make good faith efforts to meet specific goals of minority employ-
ment, questions of due process and equal protection must also be
examined.
Affirmative Action Through a Federal Initiative
Through affirmative action programs in the construction industry
the federal government has sought to achieve levels of minority
employment proportional to the minority population percentage in
the community. This is effected by making the contract award in
all federally-assisted construction projects contingent upon the in-
clusion of specified minority hiring provisions in the contract. Since
1970 the federal policy has been one of encouraging the local com-
munity to devise its own "hometown" solution which must satisfy
certain Department of Labor criteria.
Affirmative action programs are part of the federal government's
efforts to grapple with the problems arising from discriminatory
employment practices. The history of the affirmative action concept
centers on the federal government's exercise of its right to determine
the terms upon which it will enter into contracts and its responsibil-
ity to exercise its authority to achieve for minorities the guarantees
expressed in the Constitution.
The federal government's major legislative effort to meet its re-
sponsibility to eliminate discrimination in employment commenced
with the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' Title
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2000e-17 (Supp. 1972).
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VII prohibits discrimination in hiring or discharge practices, or in
any phase of employment as well as any classification, limitation,
or denial of privileges and opportunities on the basis of race, sex,
color, religion, or national origin.2 Under Title VII the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was created and
charged with assuring that opportunities for employment and pro-
motion be provided on the basis of ability and qualifications, with-
out regard to race, color, sex, religion, or nationality.' The primary
functions of the EEOC are the investigation of complaints and the
elimination of unlawful employment practices by means of informal
conciliation.'
An important feature of the 1964 act is that Congress manifestly
stated that it was not its intent to interfere with current or future
state laws. Rather, the act, including the provisions of Title VII, is
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
3. Id. § 2000e-4.
4. Id. § 2000e-4(f) provides: "The Commission shall have power- (1)
to cooperate with and, with their consent, utilize regional, State, local, and
other agencies, both public and private, and individuals; (2) to pay wit-
nesses whose depositions are taken or who are summoned before the Com-
mission or any of its agents the same witness and mileage fees as are paid
to witnesses in the courts of the United States; (3) to furnish to persons
subject to this subchapter such technical assistance as they may request
to further their compliance with this subchapter or an order issued there-
under; (4) upon the request of (i) any employer, whose employees or some
of them, or (ii) any labor organization, whose members or some of them,
refuse or threaten to refuse to cooperate in effectuating the provisions of
this subchapter, to assist in such effectuation by conciliation or such other
remedial action as is provided by this subchapter; (5) to make such techni-
cal studies as are appropriate to effectuate the purposes and policies of this
subchapter and to make the results of such studies available to the public;
(6) to refer matters to the Attorney General with recommendations for
intervention in a civil action brought by an aggrieved party under section
2000e-5 of this title, or for the institution of a civil action by the Attorney
General under section 20OOe-6 of this title, and to advise, consult, and
assist the Attorney General on such matters."
5. Id. § 2000e-7 provides: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed
to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or pun-
ishment provided by any present or future law of any State or political
subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to require
or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment
practice under this subchapter."
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essentially a legislative restatement of the equal protection and due
process guarantees. Despite its noteworthy inroads into the area of
discrimination in employment, Title VII by itself had many short-
comings, the most crippling of which was the lack of enforcement
powers for the EEOC; the Commission was to seek compliance
through conciliation and persuasion.' As a result, the EEOC was
totally powerless to compel any changes. Only when obvious "pat-
terns or practices" of employment discrimination were found to
exist would the Justice Department take action.' Instances where
the discriminatory practices were less than obvious remained unre-
solved or became the responsibility of the individual acting on his
own under the provisions of Title VII.
The Civil Rights Act was amended in 19721 to vest the Commis-
sion with the enforcement powers lacking under the 1964 act. Under
the 1972 act, the EEOC may bring a civil action, except against a
governmental agency, if informal methods have failed,'" and the
Attorney General is authorized to sue a governmental agency that
refuses the EEOC's conciliation attempts." The private right of
action which was the key feature of the 1964 act is retained by the
1972 amendment." The private action, however, is replete with pro-
cedural difficulties,'" and a charge against an offending employer
can be easily defeated by a showing that the discriminatory practice
results from "bona fide" systems of operations which are "not the
result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion,
6. Id. § 2000e-4(f). See note 4 supra for text of statute.
7. Id. § 2000e-6.
8. Id. § 2000e-5.
9. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2000e-17 (Supp. 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970).
10. Id. § 2000e-5(f).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The grievant must file his charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and receive statutory notice from the
Commission that it has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance. But
before the complainant can file a civil action in the federal court, he must
wait thirty days after receiving notice of failure of compliance from the
Commission; he must also exhaust his administrative remedies prior to
commencement of the suit. Id. § 2000e-5.
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sex, or national origin ..
Questions of standing and the class of persons that can be repre-
sented by any given plaintiff have unveiled further weaknesses in
the 1964 act. Although these questions generally have been decided
in favor of the plaintiff, lengthy appeals have often been necessary.,'
Individual plaintiffs in a Title VII action might not have the assets
to litigate their claim. Chances, of successful implementation of any
social reform which depend on the financial position of the victims
are slim at best. Another difficulty encountered is the broad lan-
guage of section 706(g) which has confused courts with respect to
whether relief is limited to the person aggrieved or whether it could
go beyond the individual and effect the elimination of the discrimi-
natory employment practices which were the subject of the action.'
Experience under Title VII had been sufficiently dissatisfactory
to warrant more specific and enforceable measures. To this end,
President Lyndon Johnson, persuant to the provisions of Title VII,
issued Executive Order No. 11,246 on September 24, 1965.'1 This
executive order required government contracts and subcontracts to
14. Id. § 2000e-2(h). Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th
Cir. 1969) held employer not in violation of statute if classification is not
based solely on race, color, religion, sex or national origin; Weeks v. South-
ern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) required employer to
show he had a factual basis for believing all women would be unable to
perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved, id. at 235;
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967) found
no conspiracy to discriminate against plaintiffs, id. at 350-56.
15. E.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th
Cir. 1969). The trial court had held that the plaintiff could represent in a
class action only other discharged Negro employees. On appeal, the circuit
court held that since the plaintiff sought relief "across the board" against
unequal employment practices allegedly committed by the employer pur-
suant to a policy of race discrimination, a class action on behalf of all
Negro employees was appropriate: the trial court had committed error in
refusing to allow the individual to represent the class until he had proven
his own right to relief. Id. at 1124-25.
16. For a discussion of judicial application of Title VII provisions see
Morse, The Scope of Judicial Relief Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 516, 520 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Morse].
17. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1970).
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contain equal opportunity clauses" which not only were to prohibit
discrimination but also required the contractor to take certain af-
firmative action to implement nondiscriminatory hiring policies.
The affirmative action included adherence to rules promulgated by
the Secretary of Labor, advertising of nondiscriminatory employ-
ment policy, and notification to all associated unions of their
resulting contractual obligations.'9
The right of the federal government to determine the terms upon
which it will enter into contractual relationships is the dominant
means by which the government can attain compliance with its
affirmative action program. The power of a state to determine terms
of contract was recognized by the Supreme Court in Atkin v.
Kansas"' and extended by the Court to the federal government in
Ellis v. United States." The fifth circuit in Farkas v. Texas Instru-
ment, Inc.,2 acknowledged this power, and held that the federal
government has a right to make provisions for the manner in which
it will procure property and services. 3
The government frequently has elected to exercise its right to
determine contract terms by means of executive orders,24 particu-
18. Id. § 202, 3 C.F.R. 340 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
19. Id. For a discussion of the equal opportunity clause provisions re-
quired by Exec. Order No. 11,246 see Coney, Affirmative Action Dents the
National Labor Policy, 10 DUQUESNE L. REV. 1 (1971).
20. 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
21. 206 U.S. 246 (1907). In this opinion Mr. Justice Holmes stated:
"We see no reason to deny to the United States the power thus established
for the States [in Atkin, supra]. Like the States, it may sanction the
requirements made of contractors employed upon its public works ...
Congress, as incident to its power to authorize and enforce contracts for
public works, may require that they shall be carried out only in a way
consistent with its views of public policy. . . " Id. at 255-56.
22. 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
23. Id. at 632 n.1.
24. The Farkas case, supra note 22, centered on the provisions of Exec.
Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1961), which prohibited discrimination
because of national origin. The court, in recognizing the validity of the
order as a proper method of defining governmental conditions of contract,
was "hesitant to say that the antidiscrimination provisions of Executive
Order No. 10,925 are so unrelated to the establishment of 'an economical
and efficient system for. . . the procurement and supply' of property and
19741
310 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. II
larly in matters relating to civil rights. Since 1941 it has dealt with
discrimination in employment by specifying in executive orders the
terms and conditions under which it is willing to contract with
private parties.2" The executive order,2" a useful and flexible device
for meeting the specific needs of given situations, has become the
vehicle for putting anti-discrimination policies into the mainstream
of employment practices.
Under Executive Order No. 11,246, the Secretary of Labor is given
the authority to adopt such rules and regulations as he deems neces-
services, 40 U.S.C.A. § 471, that the order should be treated as issued
without statutory authority." 375 F.2d at 632 n.1.
25. E.g., Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1941), reaffirming the
policy of full participation in employment concerning the defense program;
Exec. Order No. 9346, 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1943), amending Exec. Order No.
8802 by establishing a new committee on fair employment practice; Exec.
Order No. 10,308, 3 C.F.R. 837 (1951), strengthening the means for obtain-
ing compliance with the nondiscrimination provisions of federal contracts;
Exec. Order No. 10,479, 3 C.F.R. 961 (1953), establishing a federal govern-
ment contract committee to enforce the nondiscrimination provisions of
government contracts; Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1961), estab-
lishing the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity;
Exec. Order No. 11,114, 3 C.F.R. 774 (1963), extending the authority of the
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and requiring
contractors to meet higher compliance standards; Exec. Order No. 11,246,
3 C.F.R. 339 (1965), requiring equal employment opportunity provisions in
all government contracts.
26. A discussion of the strength of an executive order is found in Mr.
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952): "1. When the President acts pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maxi-
mum . . . .In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said...
to personify the federal sovereignty . . . .2. When the President acts in
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only
rely upon his own independent powers . . . . [C]ongressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter,
enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.
In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives
of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theo-
ries of law. 3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for
then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any consti-
tutional powers of Congress over the matter." Id. at 635-37.
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sary to administer the order, and in furtherance of this authority the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) was created." The
responsibility of the OFCC is to make pre-award compliance re-
views to ensure that each bidder will comply with the equal oppor-
tunity clause provisions of the contract.
Department of Labor Orders of June 27, 1969 and September 23,
1969 established the first major affirmative action program-the
Philadelphia Plan." This plan is the model upon which all major
27. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 201, 3 C.F.R. 340 (1965).
28. Dep't of Labor Order of Sept. 23, 1969, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE
1708, 1710. The plan covers a five county area surrounding Philadelphia
and establishes numerical standards or ranges of minority employment in
certain construction crafts, e.g., in 1969 only .5 percent of the Plumbers
and Pipefitters Union were minority persons. The Philadelphia Plan pro-
vided for minority employment participation increases in this trade to 5-8
percent (1970), 10-14 percent (1971), 15-19 percent (1972), 20-24 percent
(1973). When the contractor submits his bid, he must include an accepta-
ble affirmative action program based on the federal ranges. The courts
distinguish these ranges from quotas on the grounds that if a quota is not
met, sanctions are automatically applied. Under the plan, the contractor
is deemed in compliance with his affirmative action obligations if he can
show a "good faith effort" to meet these obligations. The elements of any
area wide plan were set forth by the OFCC in a Dep't of Labor News
Release of Feb. 9, 1970, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 1721: 1. Statement of
Purpose (to increase minority employment and union membership in the
construction industry). 2. Participants (contractors, subcontractors, un-
ions, minority civic organizations, state and local government). 3. Goals
(specific numerical or percentage goals for new minority employment in
the construction industry in the area for that year and future years). 4.
Scope (all construction work performed by contractors who are members
of the plan and not limited to federal or federally assisted construction).
Other elements include the coverage of subcontractors, financing, harmo-
nizing any provisions of a collective bargaining agreement that retards the
goals of the plan, grievance procedures, records and reports and modifica-
tions and duration of the plan. The Philadelphia Plan has been the subject
of much legal discussion and literature. For the history and evaluation of
the Philadelphia Plan and a sampling of some of the basic features of the
plan see Beaird, Racial Discrimination in Employment: Rights and
Remedies, 6 GA. L. REV. 469 (1972); Donegan, The Philadelphia Plan: A
Viable Means of Achieving Equal Opportunity in the Construction In-
dustry or More Pie in the Sky? 20 U. KAN. L. REV. 195 (1972); Nash,
Affirmative Action Under Executive Order 11,246, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 225
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succeeding affirmative action plans have been based. The OFCC
had found that certain unions in the Philadelphia area used exclu-
sionary practices resulting in the employment of a dispropor-
tionately small number of Negroes in six construction trades. The
OFCC attempted to put an end to this discrimination by requiring
that each bidder set specific goals for minority manpower utilization
to meet standards set by the Department of Labor's area coordina-
tor.
A major feature of the Philadelphia Plan is that the contractor's
good faith can defeat a determination of noncompliance for failure
to attain minority employment goals. "Good faith" under the plan
depends on the contractor's efforts to broaden his recruitment base
through at least the following activities: (1) contacting community
organizations having the ability to refer minority workers; (2) main-
taining records listing the name and address of each minority refer-
ral, together with an explanation of what action was taken with
regard to each referred worker; (3) notifying the OFCC whenever the
union with which the contractor has a collective bargaining agree-
ment has not referred a minority worker sent by the contractor or
the contractor has other information that the union referral process
has impeded him in his efforts to meet his goal; (4) participating in
training programs in the area, especially those funded by the gov-
ernment which are designed to provide skilled craftsmen. 9
Although the Philadelphia Plan has been widely acclaimed and
copied, there was a serious oversight in the plan, to wit, the limita-
tion of the plan to federally assisted projects, permitting contractors
to meet their goals by shifting minority workers from private sites
to federally assisted projects. As a result, the purpose of the plan,
to bring minorities into the construction industry, was seriously
thwarted. To eliminate the possibility of this "motorcycling" proce-
dure, the plan was amended in 19711" to extend coverage to the
(1971); Comment, Race Quotas, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 128
(1973); Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: Equal Employment Opportun-
ity in the Construction Trades, 6 COLUM. J. LAW & Soc. PROB. 187 (1970);
Note, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 522 (1971).
29. Dep't of Labor Order of Sept. 23, 1969, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE
1710(5).
30. Dep't of Labor News Release No. 108 (Feb. 19, 1971).
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contractor himself, thus covering both his federally related and pri-
vate projects."
The Philadelphia Plan is outstanding not only for its innovative
quality but for the Constitutional questions which it raised. Objec-
tions to the plan and to those modeled on it center on the setting of
specific goals for minority manpower utilization. Such quota-based
hiring necessarily raises considerations of due process and equal
protection. Courts have addressed themselves to these issues on
numerous occasions, and have generally resolved them in favor of
the quota systems-citing necessity as justification for the quotas.2
Provisions requiring the satisfaction of specific hiring goals raised
allegations of inverse discrimination. This objection resulted in a
challenge to the Philadelphia Plan in Contractors Association of
Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor.33 The district court,
citing the leading case of Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College
Dist.,:" upheld the provisions of the plan and stated:
It is equally clear that if this plan is properly administered it will be a plan
of inclusion rather than of exclusion .... The strength of any society is
determined by its ability to open doors and make its economic opportunities
available to all who can qualify. It is fundamental that civil rights, without
economic rights, are mere shadows. 5
The court rejected plaintiff's contention that compliance with the
31. Id.
32. E.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d
Cir. 1968), wherein the court stated that quota systems are required where
necessary to avoid unequal treatment on the basis of race: "Where
[classification by race] . . . is drawn for the purpose of achieving equality
it will be allowed, and to the extent it is necessary to avoid unequal treat-
ment by race, it will be required." Id. at 932. See also Otero v. New York
City Housing Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973); Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d
1 (5th Cir. 1966); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d
385, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Washington v. Baugh
Construction Co., 313 F. Supp. 598 (W.D. Wash. 1969); Quarles v. Phillip
Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968); Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F.
Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
33. 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
34. 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1004 (1970).
35. 311 F. Supp. at 1010.
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plan is tantamount to a guarantee of minority employment: "The
Plan does not require the contractors to hire a definite percentage
of a minority group. To the contrary, it merely requires that he
makes every good faith effort to meet his commitment to attain
certain goals."'' :6
On appeal, the third circuit sustained 7 the Philadelphia Plan as
being within the implied authority of the President and his "desig-
nees." " The petitioner had argued that the plan was in conflict with
a Title VII provision which specified that preferential treatment
need not be granted on account of the existing number of percent-
age imbalances.:' The court held that this provision was a "limita-
tion only upon Title VII, not upon any other remedies."" The sixth
circuit reached the same conclusion in United States v. IBEW,
Local 38: '
When the stated purposes of the Act and the broad affirmative relief authori-
zation . . .are read in context with § 2000e-2(j), we believe that section
cannot be construed as a ban on affirmative relief against continuation of
effects of past discrimination resulting from present practices (neutral on
their face) which have the practical effect of continuing past injustices.
Any other interpretation would allow complete nullification of the stated
purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.42
Hometown Plans
Following the vindication of a Philadelphia-type approach, the
federal government presented urban centers with the option of for-
36. Id. The court concluded that the Philadelphia Plan is not inconsist-
ent with the requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Even
absent publicly imposed affirmative action programs courts have ordered,
pursuant to Title VII, remedial action to alleviate the effects of past dis-
crimination. United States v. Lathers Local No. 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 36, 416 F.2d
123 (8th Cir. 1969); Heat and Frost Workers, Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d
1047 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
37. 442 F.2d 159.
38. Id. at 171.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
40. 442 F.2d at 172.
41. 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970).
42. Id. at 149-50.
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mulating their own hometown plans' : or having a Philadelphia-type
plan imposed.4 While a hometown plan may be developed by the
state or city government, it is usually formed by those parties di-
rectly affected-contractor associations, construction unions, and
minority community groups within a particular area. If a contractor
does not belong to a hometown plan he has a direct obligation to
the government to devise a detailed affirmative action program that
meets federal standards,45 including his own training program,
whenever bidding on a federally assisted construction project. The
advantages of participating in a federally approved hometown plan
are that the contractor merely complies with an already formulated
plan and that the plan itself establishes the training program
(usually with funds provided by the federal government).4"
Among the various cities that accepted the option of developing
their own solution were Chicago, Newark, and Boston. The first
Chicago Plan, agreed to in January, 1970, failed to achieve its hiring
goals and the program director was imprisoned for embezzlement. 7
The second Chicago Plan, agreed to in December, 1972, began with
a commitment by the local construction unions and members of the
Chicago Contractors Association to train 1,700 minority group
members "in construction skills and get them admitted to construc-
tion unions . . . by Sept. 30, [19731." After a survey by the OFCC
revealed that only 200 minority workers were hired as a result of the
plan, the Department of Labor terminated its approval of the plan,
refused further funding, and made plans to impose its own affirma-
tive action program."
A somewhat different approach is found in the Newark Plan,
43. 41 C.F.R. § 60-7.10 (1973).
44. Besides Philadelphia, the U.S. Dep't of Labor has imposed plans
on Washington, D.C., Atlanta, Ga., St. Louis, Mo., and Camden, N.J.; see
41 C.F.R. 60.5, 60.6, 60.8 (1973).
45. See note 28 supra.
46. Presently, there are approximately forty-seven OFCC approved
hometown plans with the majority receiving federal financial assistance for
their training programs.
47. N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1973, at 20, col. 1.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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which is limited to a single construction project,"° rather than an
entire city area. Like other plans, it requires bidders to commit
themselves to make every good faith effort to meet specific goals
within the applicable ranges in each trade. The goals set forth in
this plan were unsuccessfully challenged in Joyce v. McCrane,5 '
wherein the court stated:
Throughout this case the objectors to the implementing plan insist that it
sets up "quotas" and is therefore invalid; however, the Plan merely sets up
goals for minority employment. Sanctions cannot be imposed under the Plan
if the contractors strive to meet these goals and fall short. If good faith is
present, no sanctions can be applied, and if necessary a contractor may insist
on a hearing as to non-compliance, which hearing is of course subject to
judicial review."
The first Boston Plan involved contractors, labor unions and mi-
nority representatives in establishing goals to integrate the con-
struction labor force in the Boston metropolitan area over a five year
period."3 The Department of Labor funded the plan but became
dissatisfied with its progress and withheld funding for the second
year until improvements were instituted.54 The second Boston Plan,
effective January 1972, was formulated by the contractors and labor
unions, without the state, city and minority community participa-
tion. This plan was endorsed by the Department of Labor and fund-
ing of the recruiting and training program under it was resumed. 5
The state of Massachusetts, however, became dissatisfied with
the progress of the federally approved hometown plan and devel-
oped its own state affirmative action standards which had to be
satisfied for all state assisted construction projects. The bids for the
construction of Boston State College were the first to require both
50. The Newark Plan was imposed by the State of New Jersey in com-
pliance with Exec. Order No. 11,246, to ensure equal opportunity in the
federally assisted construction of the New Jersey College of Medicine and
Dentistry in May, 1969, after efforts by representatives of the federal and
state governments, labor and minority organizations were unable to agree
on a voluntary effort. Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284, 1286-89
(D.N.J. 1970).
51. 320 F. Supp. 1284.
52. Id. at 1291.
53. Associated Gen. Contractors of Massachusetts v. Altshuler, Civil
Action No. 73-1250, at 2 (1st Cir. Nov. 30, 1973).
54. Id. at 6.
[Vol. IH
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the state's own affirmative action clause (section 1B) and the fed-
eral Boston Plan conditions in the same contract. Section 1B re-
quires the contractor to meet minimum minority manhour quotas
in each job category involved in the project. These minimums are
higher than those provided for in the federally approved Boston
Plan."
The Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts comm-
enced an action in the federal district court alleging that the federal
program established pursuant to Executive Order No. 11,246
preempted the field and that section 1B violated the supremacy,
due process and equal protection clauses, particularly through the
inclusion of allegedly unconstitutional quota provisions. In
Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts v. Altshuler,57 the
Contract rs requested the court to permanently enjoin the Secre-
tary of the State Executive Office of Transportation and Construc-
tion from soliciting bids or proposals on the Boston State College
Project or any other which would include the Commonwealth's
equal employment opportunity bid conditions as contained in sec-
tion lB. The district court upheld both the state-imposed affirma-
tive action requirements and the hometown solution recognized by
the Department of Labor. The court recognized that a serious racial
imbalance existed since minority membership in the labor union
was only 7 percent while in the community minorities accounted for
23 percent of the population." The court relied on the Supreme
Court's rationale in Turner v. Fouche,1 and recognized a presump-
tion of discrimination which called for a remedy.'" The court found
no federal intent or purpose to preempt the field, no conflict result-
55. Id.
56. Section 1B requires that the contractor: "maintain on his pro-
ject, . . . a not less than twenty percent ratio of minority employee man
hours to total employee man hours in each job category. . . ." Id. at 2.
57. 361 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Mass.), aff'd, Civil Action No. 73-1250 (1st
Cir. Nov. 30, 1973).
58. 361 F. Supp. at 1299.
59. 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
60. Other cases where inferences of racial discrimination arise from
statistical showings are: Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 323 (8th Cir.
1971); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. 433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970);
Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 247 (10th Cir. 1970).
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ing from the state's more stringent requirements, and no constitu-
tional violation resulting from the quota provisions.
On appeal," the first circuit examined Hines v. Davidowitz2 to
determine whether the "purposes and objectives" of both plans were
compatible."a In Hines the Supreme Court had concluded that the
Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act vis-a-vis the Federal Alien
Registration Act was preempted by federal regulatory power. The
Hines opinion set forth guidelines, based on the subject matter of
the legislation, for determining preemption questions. Because for-
eign policy has consistently been the responsibility of the federal
government the Court held that it was not an area for regulation by
individual states. In view of existing federal legislation in the area,
no state could enact legislation which conflicted with, interfered
with, curtailed or complemented the federal regulations. Another
test applied was whether the state's regulation hinders the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress. "' A further consideration was the desirability of uniformity in
the area in question. "
61. Civil Action No. 73-1250 (1st Cir. Nov. 30, 1973).
62. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
63. The district court had relied on the Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S.
637 (1971), interpretation of Hines as establishing a controlling principle
that "any state legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal
law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause." 361 F. Supp. at 1299-
1300, citing 402 U.S. at 652.
64. 312 U.S. at 67.
65. Id. at 73. Additional "tests of supersession" are outlined in Chief
Justice Warren's opinion in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956):
first, is the federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the infer-
ence that Congress has left no room for supplementary state action; sec-
ond, is the federal interest so dominant as to preclude state legislation on
the same subject; third, is it necessary to avoid hampering of uniform
enforcement that the states be urged not to interfere. Id. at 502-10. The
Court, citing Hines, emphasized that no infallible test exists: "Itihe
Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of... federal
laws touching the same subject, has made use of the following expressions:
conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irre-
concilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference. But
none of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an
exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one
crystal clear distinctly marked formula." Id. at 502.
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Since nothing in Executive Order No. 11,246 mandates that af-
firmative action programs be uniform and since federal policy en-
courages "hometown" solutions, there is, apparently, no intention
to preempt. The Secretary of Labor, as amicus curiae, stated that
the federal program was not meant to preempt state programs and
that congressional policy, as expressed in Title VII, explicitly denies
any intent to preempt the field." The circuit court also cited
Schwartz v. Texas 7 where the Supreme Court stated:
It will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede the
exercise of the power of the state unless there is a clear manifestation of
intention to do so. The exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be
presumed. 8
Since "[bloth plins envisage minority hiring goals as a means of
achieving equal opportunity"" and since there is no requirement of
uniformity, the circuit court sought to determine if both plans con-
flicted in practice.
In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul'" the Supreme
Court had upheld a California Agriculture Code which contained a
higher standard of fruit maturity for certification than did the fed-
eral regulation. The Court held that:
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000h(4) (1970) states: "Nothing contained in any title
of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Con-
gress to occupy the field in which any such title operates to the exclusion
of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this
Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such
provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act. . . ." In
Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940), the determination of Congres-
sional intent in preemption cases was considered controling, e.g., has Con-
gress, by its enactment, undertaken to deprive the state of the power to
impose any regulation?
67. 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
68. Id. at 202-03. See also New York State Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Dub-
lino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902). But see
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), where the Court advanced a
theory of "negative implication" which poses the following question as a
possible test in deciding preemption cases: absent Congressional action,
does the existence of federal power in a given area create a negative impli-
cation as to state power?
69. Civil Action No. 73-1250 at 8.
70. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
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The principle to be derived from our decisions is that federal regulation of a
field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power
in the absence of persuasive reasons - -either that the nature of the regulated
subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmis-
takably so ordained."
In Altshuler, the contract clause attacked by the petitioner, section
1B, simply set higher standards than the federally certified Boston
Plan. Just as the Court in Florida Lime had determined that the
federal statute set only minimum standards, the Massachusetts
supplements to the federal plan were upheld in Altshuler because,
"[bjy complying with § 1B's minority hiring goals on projects
funded by both the state and the federal government, contractors
would also comply with the [federal] Boston Plan's goals."7 2
The circuit court found no constitutional violation of equal pro-
tection since without affirmative action past discrimination results
in self-perpetuating inequity." The court likewise concluded that
the Commonwealth's good faith requirement of "every possible
measure" to be taken on the part of the contractor and the require-
ments for notice and hearing opportunities guaranteed due pro-
cess.74
71. Id. at 142.
72. Civil Action No. 73-1250 at 10. In Colorado Anti-Discrimination
Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714 (1963), a Negro's
complaint, charging violation of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act of
1957 in his failure to be hired as a pilot, was dismissed by the state court
because the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and following executive orders
were determined to have preempted the field in providing equal opportun-
ity. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the State Act was not an
undue burden on commerce and that "[tjo hold that a state statute
identical in purpose with a federal statute is invalid under the Supremacy
Clause, we must be able to conclude that the purpose of the federal statute
would to some extent be frustrated by the state statute." Id. at 722. The
Massachusetts District Court in A ltshuler saw the Executive Order in
Colorado in the same relationship to the Colorado statute as Executive
Order No. 11,246 to § lB.
73. Civil Action No. 73-1250 at 12. The circuit court based this holding
on Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965), which stated that a
court has a "duty to render a decree which will as far as possible eliminate
the discriminatory effects of the past . . ." Id. at 154.
74. Civil Action No. 73-1250 at 19. The circuit court applied Massachu-
setts decisions construing other Commonwealth statutes which, while lack-
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Affirmative Action in New York
The question of preemption in Altshuler involved the usual par-
ties, to wit, federal and state governmental authorities. But in New
York the right of a state's political subdivision to supplement feder-
ally approved state action will have to be explored and defined.
The present situation in New York is the result of the develop-
ment of local plans by a number of cities."5 These cities chose the
option of formulating their own plans rather than have a federal
plan imposed on them." Two of the outstanding New York Plans are
those enacted by Rochester and Buffalo.
Formally adopted in August, 1970 by unions, contractors, and
minority representatives, the Rochester Plan, which was approved
by the OFCC, takes an area, rather than a project-by-project, ap-
proach." The plan proposes a training program for minority workers
to become eligible for union membership and applies to all govern-
ment assisted and private construction within the area. The stated
goal is "to make every effort to achieve year by year, over a period
of not more than five years, a level of minority group employment
in each craft which is representative of the minority population in
the community."" Unlike other local plans, the Rochester Plan does
not include involvement by the city government; this has proved to
be a source of criticism of the plan, as has the lack of substantial
minority participation in its formulation."
ing express provisions of notice and hearing, were considered as "impliedly
calling for such due process requirements." Id.
75. For a detailed analysis of New York State affirmative action pro-
grams, see NEW YORK COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HOMETOWN PLANS FOR
THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY IN NEW YORK STATE, A REPORT TO THE U.S.
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS (October, 1972) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL
RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT].
76. See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
77. Other plans established ranges for minority employment in various
trades with respect to a particular construction project, e.g., the Newark
Plan centered on the construction of a medical and dental school and the
Boston Plan on a state university building project. The Rochester Plan,
like the Philadelphia Plan, covers all construction throughout the area
within the geographical limits of the plan.
78. Civil Rights Commission Report 34.
79. Id. at 35, 45.
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In contrast to the Rochester Plan, the Buffalo Plan emphasizes
local involvement in the resolution of conflicts arising from a partic-
ular construction project. The first Buffalo Affirmative Action Pro-
gram was announced in February, 1970, and by October of that year
all necessary parties had agreed to participate in the plan.,' Objec-
tions to the provisions of the plan, particularly on questions of repre-
sentation and responsibility for training, continued to plague the
program and led to its revision in December, 1970. The revised plan
required each political subdivision in the Buffalo area to include the
requirements of the plan in all contracts. The Department of Labor
approved the plan in August, 1971, despite a lack of minority repre-
sentation in drafting the plan which directly contradicted OFCC
guidelines requiring minority participation in the development of
hometown plans."
Problems with the Buffalo Plan and the proliferation of local
programs throughout the state again raised the challenge of devising
a model plan acceptable to all concerned. To this end a training
agreement was signed in New York City on December 10, 1970 by
former Mayor Lindsay, former Governor Rockefeller and Messrs.
P.J. Brennan and T.J. Broderick, officers of the New York Building
and Construction Industry.,"
80. A minority organization, BUILD (Build Unity, Independence, Lib-
erty and Dignity) was formed and signed the plan after other minority
organizations refused. Id. at 48.
81. Other criticisms center on the lack of yearly numerical goals for
each craft, thus rendering judgment of the success or failure of the plan
difficult to ascertain before its duration expires. Id. at 62.
82. Training Agreement between New York Building and Construction
Industry Board of Urban Affairs Fund and the State of New York and the
City of New York [hereinafter cited as Training Agreement[, copy on file
in the Fordham. Urban Law Journal office. The Training Agreement was
signed on Dec. 10, 1970 by Gov. Rockefeller for the State, Mayor Lindsay
for the City, and Peter Brennan, (now U.S. Secretary of Labor) and
Thomas Broiderick, Jr. for the city Building and Construction Industry.
This plan became known as the New York Plan and was designed by the
Board of Urban Affairs, which was created in 1969 by the Building and
Construction Trades Council, the Building Trades Employers Association
and the General Contractors Association in response to demands by the
minority community and government agencies for increased minority par-
ticipation in the construction industry.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
This plan (New York Plan) purports to establish a uniform pro-
gram of affirmative action in accordance with applicable federal,
state and city legislation, regulations, and executive orders by es-
tablishing a training program in the crafts and skills of the city
construction industry to ensure "continuity of training and entrance
lof trainees] into the industry."" An administrative committee
was formed to operate the program 4 and trainees were divided into
two classes, those with no construction skill experience (new train-
ees)", and those with some experience in construction skills but not
qualified as full journeymen (experienced trainees)." A maximum
of 800 trainees was contemplated for the first year and plans were
made for a Central Training Facility to serve as a coordinating
point. ," Disputes arising from the operation of the agreement were
to be resolved by the administrative committee and, if a unanimous
decision could not be reached, any three dissenting members could
submit the dispute to arbitration."
Prior to the adoption of the New York Plan, New York City had
operated under a contract compliance program of its own, with
substantial success."' The keystone of this city program was Execu-
tive Order No. 71 issued by Mayor Lindsay on April 2, 1968.11' The
order required, inter alia, that in every city assisted construction
contract the contractor must comply with the following provisions:
(1) Not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employ-
ment because of race, creed, color, or national origin; (2) Include
this non-discrimination pledge in all solicitations or advertisements
83. Training Agreement, art. I, § 2.
84. Id. at art. II. This committee consists of ten members-three union
representatives, three employer representatives, three minority represent-
atives (named jointly by the Mayor and Governor) and one ex-officio mem-
ber named by the Officers of the Board of Urban Affairs.
85. Id. art. III.
86. Id.
87. Id. art. IV.
88. Id. art. VI.
89. "Statistics of minority participation in construction unions and
apprenticeship programs in New York City, though far from ideal, are
better than any in the Nation." CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT 75.
90. Exec. Order No. 71, April 2, 1968. 96 THE CITY RECORD 2842 (April
10, 1968).
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for employees; (3) Inform each labor union or employee group with
which he has a collective bargaining agreement of his commitments
under this order; (4) Include in his bid a program of affirmative
action "to provide for equal employment and opportunity in accord-
ance with the intent and purpose of this Executive Order;"'" (5)
Furnish all information and reports required by the order; (6) Com-
ply with all provisions of Executive Order No. 71 "and of the rules,
regulations, and orders issued pursuant thereto;"92 (7) Include these
provisions in every subcontract so that such provisions are binding
upon the subcontractor. 3
The order placed general responsibility for achieving compliance
with its provisions in the Office of the City Administrator which had
to approve the affirmative action program of the contractor before
the city contract could be awarded. Subsequent to the award of the
contract, compliance reports were to be filed regularly by the con-
tractor with the contracting agency.94 If a contractor did not meet
his obligations under Executive Order No. 71 his contract could be
suspended or terminated and the contractor declared ineligible for
further city contracts.95
In 1970, the city supplemented Executive Order No. 71 with Exec-
utive Order No. 2096 which provided for on-the-job training pro-
grams in city financed or assisted construction projects. Section 2
incorporated the provisions of Executive Order No. 71 and required
the contractor to: (1) Participate in an on-the-job training program
and make "a good faith effort to achieve the goal of one trainee to
every four journeymen of each craft."97 (2) Participate in programs
"for rapid advancement to full journeymen pay scale for new minor-
ity employees who by training and experience can perform the du-
ties of a qualified journeyman."98 (3) Join with appropriate agencies
and unions "to discuss goals for the employment and training of
91. Id. § 9(a).
92. Id. § 2(a)(4).
93. Id. § 2(b).
94. Id. § 3(a).
95. Id. § 2(a)(6).
96. Exec. Order No. 20, July 15, 1970. 98 THE CITY RECORD 4931 (July
20, 1970).
97. Id. § 2(1).
98. Id. § 2(2).
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minority groups." 09 While determination of compliance was still the
responsibility of the Office of the City Administrator, the Manpower
and Career Development Agency was authorized to establish a re-
view committee, to recruit, screen and place minority individuals in
appropriate jobs and training programs and to promulgate regula-
tions necessary for implementation of the order. °0
Following the signing of the federally approved New York Plan,"'
the mayor issued Executive Order No. 31,102 the effect of which was
to make the New York Plan the official policy of the City of New
York. Under Executive Order No. 31 compliance with the New York
Plan was deemed satisfaction of all requirements contained in the
prior Executive Order No. 71.101 Despite the moderate success of the
plan,"4 New York City withdrew from it in January, 1973.15 In his
statement announcing the city's action, Mayor Lindsay expressed
disappointment with the results of the New York Plan' 6 and called
for the federal government to impose a Philadelphia type plan cov-
99. Id. § 2(3).
100. Id. § 3.
101. See note 78 supra.
102. Exec. Order No. 31, January 18, 1971, 99 THE CITY RECORD 29613
(July 23, 1971).
103. Id. § 4(a).
104. From the time of the execution of the New York Plan to the end
of the calendar year 1972, a total of 7,923 minority community members
were recruited in the city construction industry in various federally recog-
nized categories. NEW YORK BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY BOARD
OF URBAN AFFAIRS FUND, REPORT OF NEW YORK BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY'S EEO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE
NEW YORK PLAN 1 (1973).
105. Exec. Order No. 74, Jan. 23, 1973, 101 The City Record 30226
(Feb. 2, 1973). The effect of this order appeared to continue the affirmative
programs that the city had operated under prior to the adoption of the New
York Plan.
106. "As of June 30, 1972, after the most vigorous and hard-nosed effort
including imposition of a seven month, $300,000,000-construction freeze on
all City construction to secure union compliance with the agreement, only
537 minority trainees had been placed. This was more than any other City
had managed, but far fewer than the target number." News Release, 21-
73, John V. Lindsay, Jan. 12, 1973, copy on file in the Fordham Urban Law
Journal office.
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ering all federally financed construction in the city."7 With the with-
drawal of the city from the New York Plan, all bidders on city
assisted construction projects were once againrequired to comply
with Executive Order No. 71.
On April 17, 1973, Mayor Lindsay announced new affirmative
action requirements for all contractors bidding on new city financed
or assisted projects.""0 These requirements, amended in July,"'0 serve
as the minimum standards that must appear in the bid of any
contractor who hopes to be awarded any city construction contract.
The plan covers all those construction contracts receiving direct or
indirect city financial assistance,"" and requires the contractor to
set goals of minority manpower utilization in terms of man-hours in
at least those percentages specified by the city."' As a minimum,
by mid-1978, contractors are required to make a good faith effort to
"employ minority journeymen in each building and construction
trade in approximately the same proportional representation as the
percentage of minorities in the population of the City of New
107. Id.
108. News Release, 234-73, John V. Lindsay, April 17, 1973, 101 THE
CITY RECORD 1574 (May 2, 1973). The Mayor also requested legislation by
the City Council imposing additional sanctions on those failing to comply
with the new standards. Int. No. 1239, of May 17, 1973 proposes to amend
the Administrative Code of the City of New York along these lines.
109. 101 THE CITY RECORD 30361 (July 14, 1973).
110. Rules, Regulations, and Orders of the City Administrator
Promulgated pursuant to Executive Order No. 71 § 1(d), 101 The City
Record 2594 (July 14, 1973) [hereinafter referred to as city plan]. The
forms of financial assistance included: "tax abatements; tax exemptions;
air rights; zoning changes; land use changes; and the sale, lease and dispo-
sition of property."
111. City plan § 2(a). Under the city plan, if a private hospital planned
to construct a new building and was receiving some form of city assistance
every contractor in his bid would have to submit various provisions con-
cerning minority employment. According to the plan, a contractor would
be required to stipulate that at least 16-19 percent of all electrical work
required on any job he is engaged in would be performed by minority
members. For July, 1974 to June, 1975 this figure increases to 20-23 per-
cent; from July, 1976 to June, 1977, to 27-30 percent. The contractor would
also have to provide for the minority manhours employed in all other job
categories involved, including, carpenters, steamfitters, painters, plumb-
ers, roofers, teamsters, etc.
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York.""' The plan also provides for the contractor to participate in
programs for the advancement of minority employees to full jour-
neymen pay scale, I" encourage labor organizations to advance train-
ees to journeymen status"4 and to deal with minority subcontrac-
tors."5 As long as the contractor has made good faith efforts to attain
these standards he will be judged to be in compliance with his
affirmative action obligations."' Compliance reports are required
monthly"7 and sanctions are provided for offenders.'"8 The construc-
tion industry criticized the new plan as unworkable and argued
that, if implemented, it would add greatly to the cost of new con-
struction.'" Minority spokesmen applauded it as a meaningful step
in integrating the New York City construction industry.'2"
What is the potential effectiveness of the city plan as opposed to
previous programs? A comparison with the prototype of all affirma-
tive action plans-the Philadelphia Plan-shows a similar goal, the
correction of racial imbalances in the community's construction
labor force, with a similar approach, coverage of a specific geograph-
ical area rather than of particular projects. Both include minority
employment ranges computed on the basis of minority population
in the area, and both set approximately four years in which to
achieve their respective goals. While the city plan has wider appli-
cation, both plans cover the basic construction crafts. 2 '
112. Id. § 2(a)1.
113. Id. § 2(b).
114. Id. § 2(c).
115. Id. § 2(d).
116. Id. § 2(a)(2).
117. Id. § 3.
118. Id. § 4. Sanctions include the publishing of offenders' names,
recommendation of legal action, suspension or revocation of the contract
and exclusion of the offending contractor from bidding on any other city
project.
119. N.Y. Post, April 18, 1973, at 10, col. 1.
120. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1973, at 28, col. 4.
121. The Philadelphia Plan covers eight basic crafts-iron workers,
plumbers, pipefitters, steamfitters, sheetmetal workers, electrical workers,
roofers and water proofers and elevator construction workers. Dep't of
Labor Order of Sept. 23, 1969, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 1708(3). The
City Plan covers twenty-six crafts-electrical workers, carpenters, steam-
fitters, metal, wire and wood lathers, painters, operating engineers, struc-
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The city plan, however, can be viewed as an improvement over
the Philadelphia Plan in two important respects. The first is the
respective definitions of good faith efforts-proof of which relieves
a non-complying contractor or subcontractor from penalty provi-
sions under either plan. Under the city plan good faith is defined in
substantially narrower terms than in the Philadelphia Plan.' Sec-
ondly, the city plan provides for swifter reprisals against those who
fail to meet their good faith requirements than does the Philadel-
phia Plan.'23 The importance of these distinctions, however, is only
tural and ornamental ironworkers, plumbers, elevator constructors, brick-
layers, asbestos workers, roofers, cement masons, glaziers, plasterers,
teamsters, tile workers, tapers, boilermakers, sheetmetal workers, laborers,
tunnel workers, mason tenders, demolition workers and dockbuilders. City
Plan § 2(a)(1).
122. Good faith under the Philadelphia Plan is determined by consid-
eration of the following types of contractor or subcontractor conduct: (1)
notice of opportunity to minority employment community agencies; (2)
keeping of records indicating each minority worker referred, hired, and if
not hired, reasons therefor; (3) notification to OFCC where union referral
practices have impeded contractor or subcontractor efforts to meet good
faith goals; (4) participation in an OFCC approved training program.
Dep't of Labor Order of Sept. 23, 1969, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE
1710(5). Under the city plan good faith is determined through either of
two criteria: "(a) If the contractor can establish that it is a member of a
contractors' association or other employer organization which has as one
of its purposes the expanded utilization of minority manpower and that the
minority manpower utilization rate in that building and construction trade
by all member contractors in such association or organization itself meets
the goal on the total of all their construction projects within the city of New
York; provided, however, that if the contractor has denied equal employ-
ment opportunity, it shall not be in compliance; or (b) If the contractor
can establish that it has a collective bargaining agreement with a union
or other employee organization, that it utilizes that union or organization
as its source for over eighty percent of its manpower needs, and that the
minority manpower utilization rate in that building and construction trade
itself meets the goal on all construction projects to which the union or
organization has referred manpower within the city of New York; provided,
however, that if the contractor has denied equal employment opportunity,
it shall not be in compliance." City Plan § 2(a)(2).
123. While both plans call for periodic compliance reviews and ulti-
mate termination of the contract with an offending party, the city plan
requires more frequent progress reports and provides for more detailed
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as great as the degree to which the plans are vigorously enforced.
Without the necessary political commitment to these plans, legal
consequences and social changes will certainly be minimal.
Presently, a contractor wishing to bid on a project that involves
federal-city or state-city funds is confronted with two different af-
firmative action requirements-those of the New York plan, which
is still recognized by the federal and state governments, and those
of the city plan. The inclusion of both city and federally-approved
state requirements in the same contract has recently raised consid-
erable federal preemption problems. Without any expression of fed-
eral intention to preempt, the New York City situation is essentially
identical to the situation considered in A ltshuler, to wit, the imposi-
tion of more stringent requirements through local supplementation
of a federally approved plan. Although the Altshuler court sustained
the challenged local law and rejected the federal preemption argu-
ment, it did so in the absence of any federal expression of an intent
to preempt. Thus in an amicus curiae brief filed at trial by the
Secretary of Labor in Altshuler it was stated:
This case does not present the issues which would be present if the federal
executive branch had sought to preempt the field .... Whether the legisla-
tive policy of deference to State and local law embodied in Title VII might
be read as limiting Executive authority is a separate question. Thus if the
Secretary of Labor, acting as the duly authorized representative of the Exec-
utive charged with enforcement of the Executive Order 11246, required by
grant a condition that the state may not impose contractual affirmative
action programs different from those called for by a Federal hometown, or
imposed plan, his determination . . . would be given great and possibly
controlling weight.'24
Absent some expression of federal intention to the contrary, it would
appear that A ltshuler dictates that the New York City plan should
be sustained as an effective supplement to the federally approved
New York State Plan. 25
But the issue in New York has been complicated by exactly that
contingency absent in Altshuler. On July 19, 1973 Secretary of
procedures for the administration of sanctions. City plan §§ 3, 4.
124. Brief for Secretary of Labor as amicus curiae at 26, Associated
Gen. Contractors v. Altshuler, 361 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Mass. 1973).
125. See notes 57-68 supra and accompanying text.
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Labor Brennan issued a memorandum (Brennan Memo I) which
explicitly prohibited state and local governments from supplement-
ing federal EEO bid conditions with additional equal employment
opportunity requirements:
[Aidministering agencies are directed to inform their grantees that where
there is a viable and effective hometown or imposed construction industry
plan in operation in a geographical area, additional and/or supplementary
State or local EEO requirements may not be applied to Federally-assisted
construction projects.'
The publication of this memo posed a direct and potentially crip-
pling challenge to the New York City plan. If the memo was issued
in pursuance of the executive order, it could be successfully argued
that the directive had the force and effect of law. The status and
effect of executive orders were discussed in Farkas v. Texas Instru-
ment, Inc. "27 where the court held that an executive order is to be
accorded the force and effect given to a statute enacted by Con-
gress. '2 The court in Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co.'29 stated
that rules and regulations promulgated by governmental agencies
pursuant to a mandate or delegation of authority from Congress
have the force and effect of laws.3 0 The Farmer case is only one of
many cases holding that executive orders and rules and regulations
issued in accordance therewith are to be accorded the same force
and effect as legislative enactments. 3' Belden v. Chase '32 accorded
126. P. BRENNAN, MEMORANDUM TO HEADS OF ALL AGENCIES 2 (July 19,
1973), on file in the Fordham Urban Law Journal office. See also N.Y. Post,
Aug. 3, 1973, at 2, col. 1.
127. 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
128. Id. at 632.
129. 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964).
130. Id. at 7.
131. E.g., United States v. Gilbertson, 111 F.2d 978 (7th Cir. 1940),
wherein the court stated "[t]hat the extensions of the restriction here
involved were made by Executive Order pursuant to the statute of 1906
rather than directly by the statute we do not consider of any significance,
since administrative regulations, properly made, have been held to be
equivalent to law." Id. at 980. See also Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
342 (1920).
132. 150 U.S. 674 (1893).
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agency regulations, issued pursuant to executive orders, the full
effect of law:
The rules laid down [by the board of supervising inspectors] ...as thus
authorized have the force of statutory enactment, and their construction...
is for the court, whose duty it is to apply them as matter of law upon the
facts of a given case.133
Not unexpectedly a challenge to the city plan has arisen as a
result of the Brennan memorandum. The city had applied for a
federal grant to assist construction of the Red Hook Treatment Pro-
ject. Funding was withheld upon a determination that the New
York City Plan, as a supplement to the federally approved New
York Plan, was unacceptable under the Brennan memorandum. As
a result City of New York v. Diamond was filed on Dec. 13, 1973 in
the District Court for the Southern District of New York.'34 The city
requested a declaration that the Brennan memorandum exceeded
the Secretary's lawful authority as well as a permanent injunction
proscribing federal withholding of funds solely because of the city
plan.
Interrupting the natural progress of the Diamond suit was the
issuance of a second Brennan memorandum (Brennan Memo II)II
on January 21, 1974, which in effect provided for the recognition of
supplementary state and local bid conditions unless such conditions
are found by the Director to be "inconsistent with the Order or
incompatible with the effective implementation of the federal mi-
nority hiring and/or training plan (either voluntary or imposed) in
the area."' 6 The memo stipulates that supplementary state and
local provisions are not to be included in any federally assisted
contracts until after the period for the Director's determination (60
days) has expired. Procedures for appeal of the Director's determi-
nation are also provided.'37
133. Id. at 698.
134. City of New York v. Diamond, Civil No. 73-5293 (S.D.N.Y., filed
Dec. 13, 1973).
135. 39 FED. REG. 14,2365 (Jan. 21, 1974).
136. Id.
137. Factors to be considered in making the determination include the
impact on the successful federal plan in the area, minority population
covered by the local plan, minority participation in each trade, minority
population and availability of minorities for employment in the area con-
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The defendant in Diamond has moved to dismiss the action on
the grounds that Brennan Memo II of January 21, 1974 rendered the
controversy moot, or in the alternative, that the plaintiff has failed
to exhaust all its administrative remedies as set forth in the memo.
Support for the latter contention is found in Douglas v. Hampton '
where the District Court for the District of Columbia held that
remand to an agency with the developed expertise in the matter
may be in the interest of sound judicial administration and that
such remand is within a court's discretion.' 9
The federal challenge to the city plan which was triggered by
Brennan Memo I would have forced a determination of whether or
not this particular area of civil rights enforcement is exclusively
federal and cannot be supplemented in localities where a federally
approved program is in effect. As a result of Brennan Memo II, there
is the distinct possibility that the city plan will secure federal ap-
proval, since it appears that the New York City plan satisfies the
criteria for approval set out in Brennan Memo II.140
The New York State Department of Labor followed the federal
position in Brennan Memo I by banning supplementary bid condi-
tions on state assisted construction contracts. In a memorandum
sent to all state agency heads dealing with construction contracts
the State Department of Labor stated: "Only those plans that have
been approved by either the Governor or this Department should be
included in the specifications.""'
Since local governments derive their powers from the state, 4 ' an
examination of a state's constitution is necessary to determine the
struction industry, need and availability of training programs, estimates
of growth and attrition factors in the construction industry, adequate en-
forcement provisions, and sufficient due process safeguards. Id. at 14,2366.
138. 338 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1972).
139. Id. at 22.
140. See note 137 supra.
141. L. LEVINE, MEMORANDUM TO HEADS OF STATE CONSTRUCTION
AGENCIES (June 29, 1973), on file in the Fordham Urban Law Journal office.
See also N.Y. Daily News, June 28, 1973, at 32, col. 1.
142. This principle was recognized by the Supreme Court in Bissell v.
Jeffersonville, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 287 (1860), and by New York in Brown
v. Trustees of Hamptonburg School Dist., 303 N.Y. 484, 104 N.E.2d 866
(1952).
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scope of the local unit's powers. Article IX of the New York State
Constitution provides that:
[E]very local government shall have power to adopt and amend local laws
. ..relating to the following subjects . . .(10) The government, protection,
order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or property therein.'43
Article IX also provides that these powers are to be liberally con-
strued.'44 Thus, the city shares concurrent power with the state to
require certain standards which safeguard the rights of a significant
part of its inhabitants. The preemption problem arises from a provi-
sion in the state constitution which, while granting broad power to
local government, provides that "[E]very local government shall
have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the
provisions of. . .any general law . . .-. "
While it remains for the state to determine if the city plan is
inconsistent with the state affirmative action policies as to state-
assisted construction projects, federal approval of the city plan
would be persuasive in the state's determination. As a practical
matter, federal approval would leave the state no politically accept-
able alternative without jeopardizing an entire range of projects
dependent upon federal, state and local cooperation.
Conclusion
If the preemption problems are resolved by applying the city plan
only to projects receiving city financial assistance, and no federal or
state assistance, the effectiveness of the plan will be seriously lim-
ited. Of the nearly three billion dollars spent in New York City
annually by federal, state and city governments, approximately one
billion dollars is financed by the city and state jointly. 6 Since many
city projects are financed partially by federal and state govern-
ments, 47 at most only one-third of all public construction in the city
is solely city assisted and therefore, affected by the plan. It is ques-
tionable how effective the city plan can be given this narrow applic-
ability. ,18
143. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(ii).
144. Id. § 3(c).
145. Id. § 2(c)(i). A leading case, Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192
(1923), expresses this general principle: the regulation of municipalities is
peculiarly within the domain of the state.
146. N.Y. Times, April 18, 1973, at 43, col. 1.
147. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1973, at 38, col. 1.
148. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
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Assuming the acceptance of the city plan in light of Brennan
Memo II, the plan will still have to overcome a much more amor-
phous, yet intransigent resistance, that of the community affected.
The sources of this resistance include contractor organizations who
claim that most affirmative action programs pose additional time
and expense burdens while detracting from operational efficiency;
organized labor which is reluctant to replace established apprentice-
ship programs with the shorter training periods required by most
plans and which objects to guarantees of union membership to
trainees who complete a program which often is not under union
supervision. 5 " Further, should a compromise be effected, resistance
from minority community representatives who traditionally have
withdrawn their support as a result of the modifying of affirmative
action plans can be expected.'' If the New York City plan prevails
over these possible forms of resistance and if it receives federal
approval under Brennan Memo II (and state approval accordingly),
the plan's success is still contingent upon one further requisite
-active political support. With a new administration in City
Hall it is still unclear whether such support will be forthcoming. The
plan, however, deserves the support of all parties concerned, for it
represents a well-reasoned step toward eliminating discriminatory
practices in employment and stands as a laudable attempt in giving
realistic meaning to expressions of constitutional ideals.
149. See note 114 supra.
150. See note 28 supra.
151. CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 75, at 47-48.
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